Gibson Joseph

Traditionally, public health agencies (PHAs) wait for hospital, laboratory or clinic staff to initiate case reports. However, this passive approach is burdensome for reporters and produces incomplete and delayed reports, which can hinder assessment of disease in the community and potentially delay recognition of patterns and outbreaks. Modern surveillance practice is shifting toward greater use of electronically transmitted disease information. The adoption of electronic health record (EHR) systems and health information exchange (HIE) among clinical organizations and systems, driven by policies such as the meaningful use™ program, is creating an information infrastructure that public health organizations can take advantage of to improve surveillance practice.

Objective: To enhance the process by which outpatient providers report surveillance case information to public health authorities following a laboratory-confirmed diagnosis of a reportable disease.

The CDC's BioSense 2.0 system is designed with a user-centered approach, where the needs and requests of the users are part of its continued development. User requirements were gathered extensively to help design BioSense 2.0 and users continue to submit feedback which is used to make improvements to the system. However, in order to ensure that these needs are gathered in a formal and ongoing way, the BioSense 2.0 Governance Group, comprised primarily of state and local public health representatives, was established to advise the CDC on the development of BioSense 2.0. The Governance Group (GG) understands that to make recommendations having direct relevance and utility to the community, they must engage public health jurisdictions which use BioSense 2.0. To that end, the GG has conducted three surveys of the BioSense 2.0 community. The survey results will help inform the group's prioritized recommendations to the CDC.

Objective

In this presentation we discuss the findings and lessons learned from these surveys.

In addition to utilizing syndromic surveillance data to respond to public health threats and prepare for major incidents, local health departments can utilize the data to examine patient volumes in the emergency departments (EDs) of local hospitals. The information obtained may be valuable to hospital and clinic administrators who are charged with allocating resources. 

Indianapolis represents 92% of Marion County’s population. The county’s public hospital and clinic network provide care for 1 in 3 county residents who are Medicaid enrollees or uninsured. To assess the need for extended hours at eight public primary care clinics in Marion County, Indiana, this study examined the hospital’s ED volume. We hypothesize that

changes in the ED volume trends that corresponded to the start or end of usual clinic hours (8am-5pm) would be evidence of clinic hours’ impact on ED use.

Objective

This paper highlights the use of syndromic surveillance data to examine daily trends in ED volume at an urban public hospital.

When the Chicago Bears met the Indianapolis Colts for Super Bowl XLI in Miami in January, 2007, fans from multiple regions visited South Florida for the game. In the past, public health departments have instituted heightened local surveillance during mass gatherings due to concerns about increased risk of disease outbreaks. For the first time, in 2007, health departments in all three Super Bowl-related regions already practiced daily disease surveillance using biosurveillance information systems (separate installations of the ESSENCE system, developed at JHUAPL). The situation provided an opportunity to explore ways in which separate surveillance systems could be coordinated for effective, short-term, multijurisdictional surveillance.

Objective

This paper describes an inter-jurisdictional surveillance data sharing effort carried out by public health departments in Miami, Chicago, and Indianapolis in conjunction with Super Bowl XLI.

In 2004, the Indiana State Department of Health (ISDH) partnered with the Regenstrief Institute to begin collecting syndromic data from 14 ED’s to monitor bioterrorism-related events and other public health emergencies. Today, Indiana’s public health emergency surveillance system (PHESS) receives approximately 5,000 daily ED visits as real-time HL7 formatted surveillance data from 55 hospitals. The ISDH analyzes these data using ESSENCE and initiates field investigations when human review deems necessary.1 The Marion County Health Department, located in the state’s capitol and most populous county, is the first local health department in Indiana using ESSENCE.

Objective

This paper describes how local and state stakeholders interact with Indiana’s operational PHESS, including resources allocated to syndromic surveillance activities and methods for managing surveillance data flow. We also describe early successes of the system.

Since October 2004, the Indiana State Health Department and the Marion County Health Department have been developing and using a syndromic surveillance system based on emergency department admission data. The system currently receives standards-based HL7 emergency department visit data, including free-text chief complaints from 72 hospitals throughout the state. Fourteen of these hospitals are in Marion County, which serves the Indianapolis metropolitan region (population 865,000).

Objective

This paper describes how a syndromic surveillance system based on emergency department data may be leveraged for other public health uses.

For syndromic and related public health surveillance systems to be effective, state and local health departments and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) need access to a variety of types of health data. Since the development and implementation of syndromic surveillance systems in recent years, health departments have gained varied levels of access to personal health information for inclusion in these systems. A variety of federal, state, and local laws enable, restrict, and otherwise infl uence the sharing of health information between health care providers and public health agencies for surveillance, as well as research, purposes. Some health care providers have expressed reluctance or refused to provide identifi able data for syndromic surveillance to health departments (1), citing state privacy laws or the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) Privacy Rule (2). Although the HIPAA Privacy Rule permits health care providers to disclose protected health information without patients’ consent to public health agencies for authorized purposes, it does not supersede state laws that provide greater protection of individual privacy (2,3). The use of individuals’ health information for syndromic surveillance poses challenging questions regarding the interpretation and future development of ethical and legal standards for public health practice and research. While the practice of syndromic surveillance extends the longstanding tradition of public health surveillance as an essential element of public health practice (4), it raises in a new light equally longstanding questions about governments’ authority to collect and use health information (5). As the practice of syndromic surveillance evolves, it is in the national interest to clarify the conditions under which health information can be shared, the ways that privacy and confi dentiality can be protected, and the ways that local, state, and federal public health agencies can legally, ethically, and effectively exercise their respective responsibilities to detect, monitor, and respond to public health threats.

 

Hypertension (HTN) is a highly prevalent chronic condition and strongly associated with morbidity and mortality. HTN is amenable to prevention and control through public and population health programs and policies. Therefore, public and population health programs require accurate, stable estimates of disease prevalence, and estimating HTN prevalence at the community-level is acutely important for timely detection, intervention, and effective evaluation. Current surveillance methods for HTN rely upon community-based surveys, such as the BRFSS. While BRFSS is the standard at the state- and national-level, they are expensive to collect, released once per year, and their confidence intervals are too wide for precise estimates at the local level. More timely, frequently updated, and locally precise prevalence estimates could greatly improve the timeliness and precision of public health interventions. The current study evaluated EHR data from a large, mature HIE as an alternative to community-based surveys for timely, accurate, and precise HTN prevalence estimation.

Objective:

To assess the equivalence of hypertension prevalence estimates between longitudinal electronic health record (EHR) data from a community-based health information exchange (HIE) and the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS).