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Loschen Wayne

Description

Domains go through phases of existence, and the electronic disease surveillance domain is no different. This domain has gone from an experimental phase, where initial prototyping and research tried to define what was possible, to a utility phase where the focus was on determining what tools and data were solving problems for users, to an integration phase where disparate systems that solve individual problems are tied together to solve larger, more complex problems or solve existing problems more efficiently. With the integration phase comes the desire to standardize on many aspects of the problem across these tools, data sets, and organizations. This desire to standardize is based on the assumption that if all parties are using similar language or technology then it will be easier for users and developers to move them from one place to another.

Normally the challenge to the domain is deciding on a vocabulary or technology that allows seamless transitions between all involved. The disease surveillance domain has accomplished this by trying to use some existing standards, such as HL7, and trying to develop some of their own, such as chief complaint-based syndrome definitions. However, the standards that are commonly discussed in this domain are easily misunderstood. These misunderstandings are predominantly a communication and/or educational issue, but they do cause problems in the disease surveillance domain. With the increased use of these standards due to meaningful use initiatives, these problems will continue to grow and be repeated without improved understanding and better communication about standards.

 

Objective

This talk will point out the inconsistencies and misunderstandings of the word "standard". Specifically, it will discuss HL7, syndrome definitions, analytical algorithms, and disease surveillance systems.

Submitted by elamb on
Description

Block 3 of the US Military Electronic Surveillance System for Early Notification of Community-Based Epidemics (ESSENCE) system affords routine access to multiple sources of data. These include administrative clinical encounter records in the Comprehensive Ambulatory Patient Encounter Record (CAPER), records of filled prescription orders in the Pharmacy Data Transaction Service, developed at the Department of Defense (DoD) Pharmacoeconomic Center, Laboratory test orders and results in HL7 format, and others. CAPER records include a free-text Reason for Visit field, analogous to chief complaint text in civilian records, and entered by screening personnel rather than the treating healthcare provider. Other CAPER data fields are related to case severity. DoD ESSENCE treats the multiple, recently available data sources separately, requiring users to integrate algorithm results from the various evidence types themselves. This project used a Bayes Network approach to create an ESSENCE module for analytic integration, combining medical expertise with analysis of 4 years of data using documented outbreaks.

 

Objective

The project objective was to develop and test a decision support module using the multiple data sources available in the U.S. DoD version of ESSENCE.

Submitted by elamb on
Description

In development for over fourteen years, ESSENCE is a disease surveillance system utilized by public health stakeholders at city, county, state, regional, national, and global levels. The system was developed by a team from the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL) with substantial collaborations with the US Department of Defense Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response System (DoD GEIS), US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and numerous public health departments. This team encompassed a broad range of individuals with backgrounds in epidemiology, mathematics, computer science, statistics, engineering and medicine with significant and constant influence from many public health collaborators.

Objective

This talk will describe the history and events that influenced the design and architecture decisions of the Electronic Surveillance System for Community-based Epidemics (ESSENCE)(1). Additionally, it will discuss the current functionality and capabilities of ESSENCE and the future goals and planned enhancements of the system.

Referenced File
Submitted by elamb on
Description

National Health IT Initiatives are helping to advance the state of automated disease surveillance through incentives to health care facilities to implement electronic medical records and provide data to health departments and use collaborative systems to enhance quality of care and patient safety. While the emergence of a standard for the transfer of surveillance data is urgently needed, migrating from the current practice to a future standard can be a source of frustration. This project represents collaboration among the CDC BioSense Program, Tarrant County Public Health and the ESSENCE Team at the Johns Hopkins University APL. The objectives of the project are to: develop reusable meaningful use messaging software for ingestion health information exchange data available in Tarrant County, demonstrate the use of this data for supporting surveillance, demonstrate the ability to share data for regional and national surveillance using the messaging guide model, and demonstrate how this model can be proliferated among health departments that use ESSENCE by investigating the potential use of cloud technology. The presentation will outline the steps for achieving this goal.

Submitted by elamb on

Held on March 14, 2019.

During this 90-minute session, Aaron Kite-Powell, M.S., from CDC and Wayne Loschen, M.S., from JHU-APL provided updates on the NSSP ESSENCE platform and answered the community's questions on ESSENCE functions and features.

Held September 13, 2018.

Aaron Kite-Powell, M.S., from CDC and Wayne Loschen, M.S., from JHU-APL were available during this 60-minute session to provide updates on the ESSENCE platform as well as tips and tricks to make it more useful for members. Attendees came prepared with questions regarding ESSENCE functions, capabilities and uses.

Description

TOA identifies clusters of patients arriving to a hospital ED within a short temporal interval. Past implementations have been restricted to records of patients with a specific type of complaint. The Florida Department of Health uses TOA at the county level for multiple subsyndromes (1). In 2011, NC DPH, CCHI and CDC collaborated to enhance and evaluate this capability for NC DETECT, using NC DETECT data in BioSense 1.0 (2). After this successful evaluation based on exposure complaints, discussions were held to determine the best approach to implement this new algorithm into the production environment for NC DETECT. NC DPH was particularly interested in determining if TOA could be used for identifying clusters of ED visits not filtered by any syndrome or sub-syndrome. In other words, can TOA detect a cluster of ED visits relating to a public health event, even if symptoms from that event are not characterized by a predefined syndrome grouping? Syndromes are continuously added to NC DETECT but a syndrome cannot be created for every potential event of public health concern. This TOA approach is the first attempt to address this issue in NC DETECT. The initial goal is to identify clusters of related ED visits whose keywords, signs and/or symptoms are NOT all expressed by a traditional syndrome, e.g. rash, gastrointestinal, and flu-like illnesses. The goal instead is to identify clusters resulting from specific events or exposures regardless of how patients present – event concepts that are too numerous to pre-classify.

Objective:

To describe a collaboration with the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU APL), the North Carolina Division of Public Health (NC DPH), and the UNC Department of Emergency Medicine Carolina Center for Health Informatics (CCHI) to implement time-of-arrival analysis (TOA) for hospital emergency department (ED) data in NC DETECT to identify clusters of ED visits for which there is no pre-defined syndrome or sub-syndrome.

 

Submitted by Magou on
Description

Every public health monitoring operation faces important decisions in its design phase. These include information sources to be used, the aggregation of data in space and time, the filtering of data records for required sensitivity, and the design of content delivery for users. Some of these decisions are dictated by available data limitations, others by objectives and resources of the organization doing the

surveillance. Most such decisions involve three characteristic tradeoffs: how much to monitor for exceptional vs customary health threats, the level of aggregation of the monitoring, and the degree of automation to be used.

The first tradeoff results from heightened concern for bioterrorism and pandemics, while everyday threats involve endemic disease events such as seasonal outbreaks. A system focused on bioterrorist attacks is scenario-based, concerned with unusual diagnoses or patient distributions, and likely to include attack hypothesis testing and tracking tools. A system at the other end of this continuum has broader syndrome groupings and is more concerned with general anomalous levels at manageable alert rates. 

Major aggregation tradeoffs are temporal, spatial, and syndromic. Bioterrorism fears have shortened the time scale of health monitoring from monthly or weekly to near-real-time. The spatial scale of monitoring is a function of the spatial resolution of data recorded and allowable for use as well as the monitoring institution’s purview and its capacity to collect, analyze and investigate localized outbreaks.

Automation tradeoffs involve the use of data processing to collect information, analyze it for anomalies, and make investigation and response decisions. The first of these uses has widespread acceptance, while in the latter two the degree of automation is a subject of ongoing controversy and research. To what degree can human judgment in alerting/response decisions be automated? What are the level and frequency of human inspection and adjustment? Should monitoring frequency change during elevated threat conditions?

All of these decisions affect monitoring tools and practices as well as funding for related research.

 

Objective

This purpose of this effort is to show how the goals and capabilities of health monitoring institutions can shape the selection, design, and usage of tools for automated disease surveillance systems.

Submitted by elamb on
Description

When the Chicago Bears met the Indianapolis Colts for Super Bowl XLI in Miami in January, 2007, fans from multiple regions visited South Florida for the game. In the past, public health departments have instituted heightened local surveillance during mass gatherings due to concerns about increased risk of disease outbreaks. For the first time, in 2007, health departments in all three Super Bowl-related regions already practiced daily disease surveillance using biosurveillance information systems (separate installations of the ESSENCE system, developed at JHUAPL). The situation provided an opportunity to explore ways in which separate surveillance systems could be coordinated for effective, short-term, multijurisdictional surveillance.

 

Objective

This paper describes an inter-jurisdictional surveillance data sharing effort carried out by public health departments in Miami, Chicago, and Indianapolis in conjunction with Super Bowl XLI.

Submitted by elamb on
Description

The practice of real-time disease surveillance, sometimes called syndromic surveillance, is widespread at local, state, and national levels. Diseases ignore legal boundaries, so situations frequently arise where it is important to share surveillance information between public health jurisdictions. There are currently two fundamental ways for systems to share public health data and information related to disease outbreaks: sharing data, or sharing information. Data refers to patient level and aggregate counts of patients, and can be difficult to share legally because of privacy issues. Information refers to summaries, opinions or conclusions about data. There are few if any legal barriers to sharing information, and by definition it includes interpretation of data by knowledgeable local personnel which is vital during outbreak investigation. Currently most shared information is unstructured text, and this format makes it difficult for computers to use the information in any meaningful way. The only thing a system can do with this unstructured information is allow users to read each message.

 

Objectives

Alternate methods are needed to facilitate communication between jurisdictions during potential disease outbreaks. One alternative is to share structured information. Defined at the appropriate level, information sharing can avoid traditional data sharing barriers while capturing valuable local knowledge. The key is to identify the types of surveillance information that are neither so highly interpreted as to lose their value nor so loosely interpreted as to face traditional data sharing barriers. The objective of this work is to identify the level at which surveillance information sharing can be both feasible and beneficial, and to create a vocabulary standard that supports the exchange of structured information between diverse surveillance systems. 

Submitted by elamb on