Buehler James

In 2007-2008, the authors surveyed public health officials in 59 state, territorial, and selected large local jurisdictions in the United States regarding their conduct and use of syndromic surveillance. Fifty-two (88%) responded, representing areas comprising 94% of the United States population. Forty-three (83%) of the respondents reported conducting syndromic surveillance for a median of 3 years (range = 2 months to 13 years). Emergency department visits were the most common data source, used by 84%, followed by outpatient clinic visits (49%), over-the-counter medication sales (44%), calls to poison control centers (37%), and school absenteeism (35%). Among those who provided data on staffing and contract costs, the median number of staff dedicated to alert assessment was 1.0 (range 0.05 to 4), to technical system maintenance 0.6 (range zero to 3); and, among the two-thirds who reported using external contracts to support system maintenance, median annual contract costs were $95,000 (range = %5,500 to $1 million). Respondents rated syndromic surveillance as most useful for seasonal influenza monitoring, of intermediate usefulness for jurisdiction-wide trend monitoring and ad hoc analyses, and least useful for detecting typical community outbreaks. Nearly all plan to include syndromic surveillance as part of their surveillance strategy in the event of an influenza pandemic. Two thirds are either "highly" or "somewhat" likely to expand their use of syndromic surveillance within the next 2 years. Respondents from three state health departments who reported they did not conduct syndromic surveillance noted that local health departments in their states independently conducted syndromic surveillance. Syndromic surveillance is used widely throughout the United States. Although detection of outbreaks initially motivated investments in syndromic surveillance, other applications, notably influenza surveillance, are emerging as the main utility.

This paper describes the initiation, development and proof-of-concept phase of the ISDS DiSTRIBuTE influenza morbidity surveillance project [1].

In October 2006, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention funded four institutions, including Emory University, to conduct evaluations of the BioSense surveillance system. These evaluations include investigations of situations that represent actual or potential threats to public health in order to describe: 1) the pathways that health departments follow to assess and respond to such threats, 2) the role of various forms of surveillance, including BioSense and other syndromic surveillance systems, in enabling health departments to achieve critical milestones along these pathways, and 3) whether and how surveillance information informs healthcare practice during these events. We anticipate that these case studies will 1) identify approaches to improving BioSense and other syndromic surveillance systems, 2) describe the characteristics of events where syndromic surveillance is most apt to be useful, and 3) provide a baseline for assessing future impacts of advances in the development of BioSense and other forms of public health surveillance. This paper describes preliminary observations from initial case studies conducted by the Emory University team.

Objective

This paper describes preliminary observations from case study investigations of the uses of BioSense and other surveillance resources in public health practice.

As part of public health protection activities conducted in support of the G8 Summit in Sea Island, GA, June 2004, DPH implemented SS in the state’s coastal region using information provided from ED visits, 911 calls, and pharmacy sales. Following this high-profile event, questions arose about whether to maintain the ED system and about whether and where to extend its use in GA.  Despite the emergence of practice-based guidance for conducting SS and the growing experience of public health agencies, little guidance is available regarding strategies for identifying sites where SS should be targeted.

 

Objective

This paper describes the strategy used by the Georgia Division of Public Health (DPH) in implementing syndromic surveillance (SS), including criteria for prioritizing localities and the early results of applying these criteria in initiating new emergency department (ED)-visit based systems.

For syndromic and related public health surveillance systems to be effective, state and local health departments and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) need access to a variety of types of health data. Since the development and implementation of syndromic surveillance systems in recent years, health departments have gained varied levels of access to personal health information for inclusion in these systems. A variety of federal, state, and local laws enable, restrict, and otherwise infl uence the sharing of health information between health care providers and public health agencies for surveillance, as well as research, purposes. Some health care providers have expressed reluctance or refused to provide identifi able data for syndromic surveillance to health departments (1), citing state privacy laws or the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) Privacy Rule (2). Although the HIPAA Privacy Rule permits health care providers to disclose protected health information without patients’ consent to public health agencies for authorized purposes, it does not supersede state laws that provide greater protection of individual privacy (2,3). The use of individuals’ health information for syndromic surveillance poses challenging questions regarding the interpretation and future development of ethical and legal standards for public health practice and research. While the practice of syndromic surveillance extends the longstanding tradition of public health surveillance as an essential element of public health practice (4), it raises in a new light equally longstanding questions about governments’ authority to collect and use health information (5). As the practice of syndromic surveillance evolves, it is in the national interest to clarify the conditions under which health information can be shared, the ways that privacy and confi dentiality can be protected, and the ways that local, state, and federal public health agencies can legally, ethically, and effectively exercise their respective responsibilities to detect, monitor, and respond to public health threats.

 

The objectives of this consultation, supported by the International Society for Disease Surveillance (ISDS), were to develop expert, consensus-based recommendations to promote Canadian and U.S. collaboration in using syndromic surveillance (SS) to detect, assess, monitor, or respond to potential or actual public health threats. The consultation focused on the Great Lakes region of the Canadian-U.S. borderóa region where there is substantial flow of people and goods between the two nations, a potential for occurrence of public health emergencies that affect people in both countries. Despite prior advances achieved by participants in the Early Warning Infectious Disease Surveillance (EWIDS) program regarding cross-border collaboration in notifiable disease reporting and follow-up, the EWIDS deliberations had not substantially addressed the role and uses of syndromic surveillance as part of cross-border disease prevention and control efforts, particularly in the context of potential large-scale public health emergencies. Presentations addressed a mix of issues that define the context for cross- border collaboration, including updates on SS practice and development in jurisdictions in the region, shared methodological challenges, protocols for responding to SS alerts, health information privacy regulations, and policies concerning public health emergencies that may shape information sharing during a crisis. Potential legal barriers to information sharing centered on individual-level privacy concerns, as opposed to sharing of aggregate SS data or notices of statistical alerts based on SS data. The meeting provided an impetus and agenda for future, ongoing consideration of including syndromic surveillance as a key component within the broader context of the EWIDS process. Identified priorities included development of procedures to share information about SS alerts and alert response protocols within EWIDS, increased use of SS inputs in crossborder tabletop exercises for pandemic influenza, and further collaboration in development of mapping projects that use data inputs from both sides of the border. In addition, the participants recommended that annual ISDS conferences provide a forum to address challenges in cross-border collaboration in SS practice and research.

To examine data from 911/Emergency Medical Services (EMS) and determine whether these data provide a useful addition to syndromic surveillance (SS) when used with emergency department (ED) chief complaint (CC) data.